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Abstract
Nationally and internationally, universities are ranked in university league tables 
(ULTs). Sustained academic criticism of the rationale and methodology of compil-
ing ULTs has not stopped these rankings exerting considerable pressure on the deci-
sions of university managers. The compilation of ULTs is an inherently political act, 
with the choice and weighting of metrics resulting in particular characteristics of 
individual institutions being rewarded or penalised. One aspect that is currently not 
considered by league tables is the diversity of the student intake, and the extent to 
which an institution has been successful in widening participation (WP) in higher 
education (HE). The need to take action is reflected in target 4.3 of the fourth United 
Nations Sustainable Development Goal (SDG  4), which aims to “ensure equal 
access for all women and men to affordable and quality technical, vocational and 
tertiary education, including university” by 2030. This article explores how cur-
rent ULT metrics for universities in the United Kingdom (UK) relate to WP. Using 
publicly available data, the authors found that over 75% of UK league table met-
rics are negatively related to WP. This has the effect of making institutions with a 
diverse student body significantly more likely to be lower down in the league tables. 
The worst relationship with WP is for entry standards. Universities which recruit 
high-performing students are actively rewarded in the league tables; this fails to 
recognise that students with high entry grades are more likely to come from privi-
leged backgrounds. The authors developed a ULT which includes a WP score as 
an explicit league table metric and found that their WP-adjusted table removed the 
negative relationship between WP and league table rank, resulting in a somewhat 
fairer comparison between universities. They conclude that ULT compilers have an 
ethical duty to improve their definition of a “good” university, which in the current 
HE environment of the UK must include WP. The authors believe this should be an 
urgent priority for the sector, so that universities with a commitment to widening 
participation can be recognised and rewarded.
Keywords widening participation · university league tables · higher education 
policy · university rankings · performance measure
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Résumé
Instaurer des règles du jeu équitables  : intégrer l’élargissement de la participation 
dans les classements des universités; quels effets ? – Les universités font l’objet de 
classements nationaux et internationaux. Les critiques soutenues de la part du monde 
universitaire concernant la logique et la méthode présidant à la réalisation des classe-
ments d’universités n’ont pas empêché ceux-ci d’exercer une pression considérable 
sur les responsables universitaires. Leur organisation est un acte intrinsèquement 
politique, basé sur le choix et la pondération d’indicateurs se traduisant par une ré-
compense ou une pénalisation des établissements universitaires. La diversité des étu-
diants admis dans un établissement et la mesure dans laquelle ce dernier a réussi à 
élargir la participation à l’enseignement supérieur ne font toutefois pas partie des 
critères actuellement pris en compte dans les classements. La nécessité d’agir se fait 
jour dans la cible 4.3 du quatrième Objectif de développement durable (ODD 4) des 
Nations Unies visant d’ici 2030 à « assurer l’accès de tous à une éducation de qualité, 
sur un pied d’égalité, et promouvoir les possibilités d’apprentissage tout au long de 
la vie. » Cet article examine dans quelle mesure les indicateurs actuellement utilisés 
dans le classement des universités au Royaume-Uni ont un lien avec l’élargissement 
de la participation. S’appuyant sur des données accessibles au public, les auteurs ont 
constaté que 75 % de ces indicateurs influaient de façon négative sur le classement. 
Ainsi est-il beaucoup plus probable pour un établissement dont l’effectif estudiantin 
se caractérise par sa diversité de se retrouver plus bas dans le classement. Le pire 
rapport avec l’élargissement de la participation concerne les normes d’admission : 
les universités qui recrutent des étudiants ayant d’excellents résultats sont activement 
récompensées dans les classements – bien que cette méthode ne tienne pas compte 
du fait que les étudiants qui arrivent avec des notes élevées sont probablement issus 
de milieux privilégiés. Les auteurs ont élaboré un classement des universités qui 
inclut un critère d’élargissement de la participation et ont constaté que leur classe-
ment ajusté en fonction de cela gommait le lien négatif entre élargissement de la 
participation et place au classement, ce qui permet de comparer les universités plus 
équitablement. Ils concluent que les organisateurs des classements d’universités ont 
le devoir moral d’améliorer leur définition d’une « bonne » université, ce qui impose 
d’inclure l’élargissement de la participation dans le contexte de l’enseignement supé-
rieur au Royaume-Uni. Les auteurs pensent qu’il s’agit d’une priorité urgente pour le 
secteur et qu’il convient de la traiter comme telle pour que les universités œuvrant à 
l’élargissement de la participation puissent être reconnues et récompensées.
Introduction
University League Tables (ULTs) are an inescapable feature of contemporary 
higher education. In an attempt to identify the “best” universities, several organi-
sations compile league tables of higher education institutions (HEIs) at either an 
international or national level. The publication of the latest league tables typically 
results in significant press coverage about the rise or fall in prestige of individual 
institutions, and many universities use their league table position as a central tool in 
their recruitment and marketing to prospective staff and students. Most institutional 
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senior management teams name improving their league table position as a core goal 
(Hazelkorn 2009). League table position can also have impacts on individual stu-
dents; for example, the granting of visas to international students can be contingent 
upon their university’s position in the Academic Ranking of World Universities 
(ARWU) (Hazelkorn 2007; Hosier and Hoolash 2019).
League table curation is associated with several different – potentially conflict-
ing – purposes. Some journalistic outlets have framed university rankings in terms 
of student choice, arguing that since students generally attend a single institution for 
their undergraduate studies, information about institutional prestige should be avail-
able to potential students when they consider their options (Bowden 2000). Some 
rankings seem more aligned with politics, framed in terms of international policy 
goals such as advancing a “knowledge economy” (BIS 2016; Dill and Soo 2005), or 
national policy goals such as social justice (HEPI 2018). Accordingly, rankings can 
have political consequences. Although originally developed to provide students and 
parents with information to inform their course choices, adoption of national and 
international league tables has resulted in a more competitive higher education (HE) 
market (Hazelkorn 2009). By consequence, the use of league tables is also shaping 
institutional strategy, and placing increasing pressure on academic and professional 
services staff to target their activities towards things that will improve institutional 
league table performance (Hazelkorn 2007, 2009; Locke et al. 2008).
Although ULTs have made a major impact on universities, there is broad agree-
ment that they are flawed instruments in terms of their usefulness in measuring the 
diversity of activities taking place within universities (Hosier and Hoolash 2019; 
Locke et al. 2008; Lynch 2015; Tofallis 2012). Ever since their conception, league 
tables have been roundly critiqued for a broad range of reasons. Some of these con-
cern technical criticism of the statistical methodologies used to generate the rank-
ing hierarchy. For example, Chris Tofallis offers a close examination of the additive 
methodology used to compile scores from different indicators, and develops a sta-
tistical critique of certain normalisation algorithms (Tofallis 2012). However, most 
critics focus on the link between the raw data used and the conclusions drawn from 
their analysis (Bowden 2000; Dill and Soo 2005; Locke et al. 2008).
Reducing HEIs to a single numerical rank also has the effect of devaluing the 
broader impacts that universities have in society, which are much less easily 
 measured. For example, in the European tradition, a core purpose of education has 
always been its role in preparing people for civic life (Plato 2003; Dewey 1923). 
Universities are often described as having a role in pursuing social justice, which 
Mala Singh defines as
a search for a fair (not necessarily equal) distribution of what is beneficial and 
valued as well as what is burdensome in a society (Singh 2011, p. 482).
The reproductive mechanism of education makes it an attractive policy space to 
address wider social injustice (ibid.). It is argued that by engaging in HE, students 
from disadvantaged backgrounds become more able to access societal resources, be 
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it in purely economic terms or through accumulating social capital.1 Sociological 
analysis has described education as a site of social reproduction, in which learners 
adopt the dispositions required to succeed in their societies (Nash 1990). Univer-
sities can also redistribute resources through engaging with society on key issues, 
working towards solutions though research and knowledge exchange activity. Social 
justice will mean very different things in different national contexts. For example, 
the dominant concern might be socio-economic disadvantage in one country, but 
ethnic disparities in another. It has been disputed whether universities genuinely 
redistribute resources or not (Case 2017; Singh 2011), but the ideals of social justice 
are widespread within the HE sector. This broader civic role of universities is almost 
impossible to capture numerically, so is not well represented in league tables that 
depend on quantitative methodology.
The central contention of ULT criticism is that there is no objective construct 
of the “goodness” of all universities: on what scale are diverse institutions being 
ranked? Whatever construct universities are being ranked on is created by the ULT 
methodology rather than describing some objective truth about a varied  sector 
(Hosier and Hoolash 2019; Locke et  al. 2008). As such, league table compilation 
is an inherently political act, yet rankings are presented as an objective truth about 
the sector (Lynch 2015). Even amidst the sustained academic critique, there is 
some  recognition that the “scorecard” approach2 to collating pertinent data might 
have some value if properly executed (Tofallis 2012), although this comes with 
the  recognition that relying on ULTs as a basis for decision-making can  promote 
 contradictory values and goals (Hosier and Hoolash 2019). The selection of 
 indicators is particularly important in the ULT process. There is a strong suspicion 
in the literature that ULT compilers are “led by the nose” and use readily available 
data rather than appropriate data (Dill and Soo 2005). This suspicion is deepened 
by the general lack of any stated rationale for selecting or weighting the indicators, 
either in terms of ideology or statistical validity.
Use and impact of international and national league tables
There are many ULT systems in use, some of which rank institutions within a given 
country, while others attempt to compare universities at a global level. Internation-
ally, the most commonly used league tables are the World University Rankings of 
Quacquarelli Symonds (QS), the Academic Ranking of World Universities (ARWU) 
and Times Higher Education (THE) World University Rankings. International 
2 The “scorecard” approach emphasises the need for some stakeholders to get a broad idea of perfor-
mance “at a glance”. In the context of University League Tables, this might include collating several 
student satisfaction metrics into one Student Experience category, or simply curating a single set of raw 
performance indicators. Both actions might allow applicant stakeholders to easily compare institutions.
1 The term “social capital” refers to the accumulated social resources an individual has that they can 
use to their advantage in a given situation, as coined by the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1986). 
This might be family networks, friends and colleagues, or even the social benefits of having attended the 
“right” school.
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rankings of HEIs are compiled in various ways, but always prominently feature indi-
cators relating to research productivity, such as the number of Nobel Prize winners 
(e.g. ARWU) among current or past staff and students or the number of articles pub-
lished in or cited from international databases (e.g. AWRU, THE) (Buela-Casal et al. 
2007). Such indicators bias rankings in favour of HEIs with publications in English 
databases and scientific fields (Ordorika and Lloyd 2015). Some ranking systems 
also incorporate a “peer review” component to rankings (e.g. THE), where research-
active academics are asked to identify the top universities in their subject areas 
(Buela-Casal et  al. 2007). This has opened international ULTs up to criticism of 
cultural imperialism, since these biases make the rankings into a “Harvardometer” 
by embedding an Anglo-Saxon view of “the University” as an elite research estab-
lishment into the exercise (Ordorika and Lloyd 2015; Somers et al. 2018).
This homogenising assessment influences the behaviours of HEIs and policy 
actors at both institutional and national levels. Imanol Ordorika and Marion Lloyd 
document varied responses to the hegemony of standardised metrics (Ordorika and 
Lloyd 2015).3 In Brazil, QS’s apparent endorsement of the performance of privately 
funded HEIs (QS 2012) failed to account for both the poor quality of many private 
HEIs and the social mission of universities in many Latin American countries (Kin-
ser and Levy 2005), provoking sustained resistance from national bodies. In France, 
apparently poor ULT performance has motivated the merging of HEIs into “super-
campuses” which can compete with large institutions in the United States (Labi 
2010). Several countries consider the ULT ranking of students’ chosen institutions 
when deciding whether to grant a study visa (Hazelkorn 2007; Luxbacher 2013; 
Hosier and Hoolash 2019).
International rankings are apparently both powerful and imperfect, even when 
relying predominantly on seemingly comparable research outputs (Bowden 2000; 
Buela-Casal et  al. 2007). However, universities also have non-research functions 
such as fostering civic citizenship or technical education, and these functions will 
legitimately vary between nations (Luke and Hogan 2006). To reflect this, regional 
and national ranking systems have also been developed, which may or may not cor-
relate with the international league table positions. These national league tables vary 
considerably in their component metrics. For example, Japanese universities are pri-
marily ranked in terms of hensachi, a selectivity score which indicates the relative 
ranking of students based on mock test results (Yonezawa 2010), while the QS Uni-
versity Rankings for Latin America incorporate metrics such as employer reputation 
and the extent of relationships between the institution and other universities outside 
of the region (QS 2019).
We believe this national-level approach is particularly appropriate for attempts 
to evaluate teaching, because countries’ national secondary education systems and 
economic policy objectives differ, as do the available data sources (which in general 
3 In this context, standardised metrics refer to metrics which can be compared between institutions. For 
example, the number of citations is an internationally comparable metric, but often results in Western 
institutions with a focus on scientific research written in English to rank highest.
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will be difficult to compare) (Dill and Soo 2005). For example, entry tariff4 might 
mean a different thing in a country with a small, elite public HE system compared 
to states pursuing a mass participation model. However, quality of teaching will, in 
many contexts, be a vital part of what makes a good university. We therefore chose 
to focus our attention on the HE sector in the United Kingdom (UK) to consider 
the rankings of universities within a specific context, and how these rankings reflect 
what is considered a “good” university.
The United Kingdom league table context
The UK provides a useful case study for the compilation of league tables, since there 
are large amounts of publicly available data on each HEI. The first ULT in the UK 
was published in the Times newspaper in October 1992; meanwhile there are three 
independent league tables published each year (Turnbull 2018). These are produced 
by
(1) the Times and Sunday Times newspapers, published as the Good University 
Guide (the most recent one is O’Leary 2020);
(2) the Guardian newspaper (most recent is Guardian 2020); and
(3) the Complete University Guide (most recent is CUG 2020).
All three have the stated aim of informing prospective students’ choice of  university. 
All use different methodologies, despite the fact that these methodologies have 
been criticised for being non-transparent and non-reproducible, particularly in 
terms of the way data are normalised5 and presented as “scores” (Tofallis 2012). 
The  methodology used for each table has changed over time; for example, the Times 
league table originally used 14 equally weighted indicators of quality, and now uses 
eight metrics with unequal weightings (Bowden 2000). Only the Guardian and 
Complete University Guide tables have publicly available results and methodologies; 
the indicators and weightings included in these ULTs are listed in Table 1. Use of 
different metrics results in different lists; for example, in 2019, only 6 institutions 
were found among the top 10 in all three league tables. This demonstrates that there 
is no agreement on the “right” way to compile a league table even within the UK.
UK ULTs, like their international counterparts, have been heavily criticised, both 
as a whole (e.g. Bowden 2000) and with a focus on individual metrics. One UK-
specific criticism is the use of student satisfaction scores via the National Student 
Survey (NSS)6 (Grove 2017). NSS ratings are argued to be poor proxy measures of 
5 In this context, “normalising” data from different universities means making them comparable. This is 
done through a number of statistical methods, which are discussed in detail in Tofallis (2012).
6 The National Student Survey (NSS) “gathers [final-year undergraduate] students’ opinions on the qual-
ity of their courses which helps to inform prospective students’ choices; provide data that supports uni-
4 Entry tariff is used in the UK to encapsulate pre-university entry qualifications. The UK has several 
parallel qualification systems, each of which are awarded “tariff points” to determine a single score for 
university admissions purposes.
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teaching quality (Botas and Brown 2013; Langan and Harris 2019) and subject to 
biases (Bell and Brooks 2019). Since the NSS is completed before students gradu-
ate, NSS ratings also fail to capture the ongoing benefits of completing a degree, 
which may be highly relevant to a social justice narrative, but can take many years 
for students to appreciate (Leach 2019). Despite these criticisms, the NSS is a cen-
tral feature of all three league table calculations, and can constitute up to one quarter 
of a university’s ranking (Table 1).
Widening participation is a requirement for UK universities, 
but is not currently captured in ULTs
One striking example of the political choices made in league table compilation is 
the absence of any indicator that reflects the diversity of a university’s intake. As 
such, the current UK league tables do not capture a social justice agenda. It has long 
been noted that participation in HE is not equally distributed across the UK pop-
ulation; the Robbins Report of 1963 highlighted that young people whose parents 
Table 1  The indicators used in the Guardian and Complete University Guide league tables
Sources: Hiely-Rayner (2016) for left-hand column; CUG (n.d.) for right-hand column
Notes: This table shows the indicators used in the Guardian and Complete University Guide league tables 
with the weighting that each indicator contributes to the total score. Since the Complete University Guide 
presents weights for each item of between 0.5 and 1.5, we have converted these to % for ease of compari-
son. Similar indicators are presented side by side where possible.
*NSS is the National Student Survey
Guardian Complete University Guide
Indicator Weighting % Indicator Weighting (%)
NSS* – Teaching 10% Student Satisfaction (NSS) 1.5 (16.7%)
NSS – Assessment and Feedback 10%
NSS – Overall Satisfaction 5%
Continuation 10% Degree Completion 1.0 (11.1%)
Value Added 15% Good Honours 1.0 (11.1%)
Student:Staff Ratio (SSR) 15% Student:Staff Ratio (SSR) 1.0 (11.1%)
Expenditure per Student 5% Academic Services Spend 0.5 (5.6%)
Facilities Spend 0.5 (5.6%)
Entry Scores 15% Entry Standards 1.0 (11.1%)
Career Prospects 15% Graduate Prospects 1.0 (11.1%)
Research Quality 1.0 (11.1%)
Research Intensity 0.5 (5.6%)
versities and colleges to improve the student experience; [and] support public accountability. Every uni-
versity in the UK takes part in the NSS, as do many colleges” (OfS 2020).
Footnote 6 (continued)
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were manual workers were much less likely to attend university than those with pro-
fessional parents (Robbins 1963). This focus on disparities on student intakes was 
extended 34 years later by the Dearing Report, which considered widening partici-
pation in terms of socio-economic status, disability, mature student status and eth-
nicity (Dearing 1997).
Improving access to higher education benefits individuals and communities, and 
society in general, but widening participation (WP) efforts have had mixed success, 
and disparities still persist (Vignoles and Murray 2016). For example, in some areas 
of the UK, fewer than 10% of young people attend university, whereas in other areas 
there is 100% engagement (HEFCE 2017). Some universities have made consider-
able efforts to engage non-traditional groups in HE, whereas others disproportion-
ately recruit from populations of students who are already highly likely to enter HE 
anyway (HEPI 2018). This means that students from disadvantaged backgrounds are 
less likely to attend “elite” institutions, and that those who do gain entry are less 
likely to have peers from similar backgrounds.
There is evidence to suggest that a diverse student body has a positive impact on 
the student experience, and that interactions with a diverse cohort of students can 
benefit individual students considerably, not least in terms of their learning outcome 
(Gurin et al. 2002; Shaw 2009). Students themselves recognise that educational dis-
advantage has an impact on the chances of going to university, and generally support 
the principle of contextual admissions decision-making (Dale-Harris 2019).7
In the UK, considerable attention is being paid to university admissions in the 
popular press, and governments and HEIs have been severely criticised for failing to 
make university access more equitable (Heselwood 2018; Montacute and Cullinane 
2018). At the same time, currently well-represented groups defend the status quo in 
the press, with some criticising actions aimed at improving equity of access (Weale 
2020). Reflecting the political importance of widening access in the UK, policies 
and action plans to address WP are already regulatory requirements for all universi-
ties receiving public funds (although the issue is somewhat complicated by the devo-
lution of HE policy in the UK).8 The Higher Education Act 2004 required universi-
ties wishing to charge higher tuition fees to produce a plan to illustrate how students 
from disadvantaged backgrounds were being encouraged to participate in HE (Gov 
UK 2004). This was overseen by the new Office For Fair Access (OFFA), which has 
since been replaced by the Office for Students (OfS), established through the Higher 
Education and Research Act 2017 (Gov UK 2017). Extending the commitment to 
7 The principle of contextual admissions takes into account information beyond applicants’ grades, such 
as residence in an area with a low number of HE participants and/or having recognised refugee status 
etc. The purpose is to factor in personal circumstances which have caused significant disruptions to an 
applicant’s education and therefore had a negative impact on their studies. Applicants provide this per-
sonal information in their university application documents, either through a personal statement or other 
demographic information such as their postcode.
8 Up to 1992, HE policy was made centrally for all parts of the UK, including Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland. The devolution of HE policy in the UK was introduced through the Further and 
Higher Education Act (Gov UK 1992), which created distinct funding and regulatory arrangements for 
the separate nations.
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WP through the registration conditions for HEIs, the OfS now requires all UK uni-
versities to develop an access and participation plan which is updated on an annual 
basis (OfS 2018). As such, WP is therefore now a regulatorily required activity for 
the entire UK HE sector, and we therefore believe it is fair to judge universities on 
whether they have succeeded in widening participation.
While all publicly funded UK institutions are required to consider WP in their 
registration with OfS, some institutions explicitly make a commitment to diversify-
ing the student body in their formal mission statements. In the UK, this is formalised 
through the existence of three university “mission groups” (the Russell Group, the 
University Alliance and the MillionPlus Group), which account for roughly 50% of 
UK HEIs. Twenty-four universities are members of the Russell Group, which priori-
tises “maintaining the very best research, [and] an outstanding teaching and learning 
experience” (Russell Group n.d.), but does not make a commitment to WP. Eighteen 
institutions are members of the University Alliance (UA), which explicitly makes a 
commitment to WP in its mission statement, aiming to
open up equality of opportunity to all, regardless of background, ability and 
experience (UA n.d.).
Finally, the MillionPlus group represents 17 “modern universities” (i.e. those given 
university status in the Further and Higher Education Act 1992, Gov UK 1992). The 
MillionPlus group also actively incorporates WP in its mission statement, stating an 
aim of
supporting anyone who has the ambition, talent and desire to succeed in higher 
education, whatever their background and wherever they live in the UK (Mil-
lionPlus n.d.).
The University Alliance and MillionPlus groups thus make specific commitments 
to social justice through their core activities. The subjective choice of league table 
indicators and weightings may therefore favour particular mission groups, meaning 
that universities whose missions do not align well with ULT metrics may be unfairly 
penalised through being ranked on the same basis (Hazelkorn 2009).
ULTs, initially developed under a more exclusive conception of the (Anglo-
Saxon) University, have so far failed to recognise the need to incorporate WP into 
league table compilation. William Locke et  al. highlight that there is exceptional 
scope for the WP and ULT agendas of universities to conflict, noting that
a strategic decision to improve league table position[ing] … would be likely to 
jeopardise activities to widen access (Locke et al. 2008, p. 57).
Within the UK league tables, there is only one example of a league table metric 
which attempts to reflect the fact that universities do not have equivalent intakes, 
namely the Guardian’s “Value Added” metric.
Based upon a sophisticated indexing methodology that tracks students from 
enrolment to graduation, qualifications upon entry are compared with the 
award that a student receives at the end of their studies … an institution that 
takes in lots of students with low-entry qualifications – who are less likely 
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to achieve firsts or 2:1s – will score highly in the value-added measure if the 
number of students doing so exceeds expectations (Hiely-Rayner 2019).9
 This metric attempts to recognise that some institutions admit students with lower 
tariff scores, so should be rewarded for those students being awarded high degree 
classifications. There is therefore an expectation that some
institutions can expect to see lower average tariffs – but higher value-added 
scores (ibid.).
While it would seem fair to reward institutions admitting students from diverse 
backgrounds. this is not a direct indicator of WP, but instead a measure of student 
attainment normalised for the student’s Entry Scores. As such, explicit consideration 
of WP is currently absent from UK ULTs. We therefore think there is an urgent need 
to consider the relationship between WP and league table rankings, and to identify 
and include practical methods in the compilation of ULTs for rewarding institutions 
which successfully improve social mobility.
Aims of the current study
In this article, we explore the relationship between WP and methods of league table 
curation. Our specific research questions are as follows:
(1) To what extent do the existing league table methodologies encourage or penalise 
institutions with a commitment to WP?
(2) Is it possible to incorporate WP as a numerical league table indicator in its own 
right?
(3) What would be the impact of including WP on the relative rankings of institutions 
from different stated mission groups?
In posing these questions, we hope to contribute constructively to developing league 




If WP is going to be incorporated into ULTs, a numerical measure of student diver-
sity is required. The most direct measure of participation in HE for the UK is the 
Participation of Local Areas (POLAR) system, re-calculated every few years by 
OfS. Each local area (identified by postcode) is given a score of 1–5 depending on 
the percentage of young people from that ward (administrative section) or area who 
9 A first is a first-class honours degree; a 2:1 is an upper second-class honours degree.
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enter HE. The areas are then grouped into five groups according to their score, with 
each group or quintile representing 20% of the UK.
The lowest quintile (Quintile 1, comprising “low participation neighbourhoods”) 
represents the UK’s 20% of young people least likely to attend university, while the 
top quintile (Quintile 5) represents those young people most likely to enter HE. For 
each HEI, the percentage of students admitted from each of these quintiles is pub-
licly available from data provided by the Universities and Colleges Admissions Ser-
vice (UCAS) on its website (UCAS 2019). However, comparisons of HEIs across 
5 different numbers is non-intuitive (i.e. not immediately plausible or helpful) and 
challenging. One option, namely reducing these data to measure only the proportion 
of students in the lower POLAR Quintiles 1 and/or 2, simplifies this analysis, but at 
the cost of removing potentially informative data from the calculations.
Gini coefficients offer a solution here (Martin 2018). These coefficients are a 
single measure of inequality, often used in economics to assess income inequality 
within a nation or region. Developed by Corrado Gini in 1912 (Gini 1955 [1912]), 
the coefficient ranges from 0 to 1, with 0 representing perfect equality and 1 rep-
resenting perfect inequality. In the context of widening HE participation and the 
POLAR system, a Gini coefficient of 0 represents a HEI drawing its student body 
equally from each of the five quintiles, and is therefore representative of the national 
student body. A score of 1 would indicate that all students within a HEI come from 
the same POLAR quintile (likely the top Quintile 5, the highest participating group 
by definition). Therefore, the lower the Gini coefficient of a given HEI, the greater 
equality of background in its student body.
For this study, we used the POLAR-based Gini coefficients graphically presented 
by Iain Martin (2018) in a policy note published by the Higher Education Policy 
Institute (HEPI). We chose this measure of WP success for a variety of reasons, 
primarily the directness in which it measures participation in HE. While other met-
rics (e.g. the Multiple Equality Measure [MEM] developed by UCAS)10 include fac-
tors that show differences in participation (e.g. gender or ethnicity), Gini coefficients 
provide a succinct and direct measure of exactly the behaviour we wish to promote, 
namely participation. Further, POLAR Gini coefficients are built upon an estab-
lished methodology for measuring inequality, and data are readily available. Gini 
coefficients therefore represent a convenient existing tool that league table compil-
ers could easily incorporate into ULTs without the need to develop and verify new 
methodologies. Finally, Gini coefficients provide a broad, holistic measure of par-
ticipation equality that is represented in a single value, simplifying inclusion into 
ULTs.
10 The multiple equality measure (MEM) “is an equality metric for higher education (HE), combining 
the effects of many of the measures currently used in the analysis of equality in HE into a single value. 
It is based on statistical modelling techniques, using UCAS’ data on progression to HE, linked with 
National Pupil Database (NPD) data on English school student characteristics, to produce an evidence-
based measure of equality at either individual or aggregate-level” (UCAS 2018, p. 2).
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Data sources
Numerical Gini coefficients presented in the HEPI policy note were kindly provided 
by Iain Martin (Martin 2018). HEIs in this dataset were assigned a mission group 
as either Russell Group (RG), Universities Alliance (UA), The MillionPlus Group 
(M+), the former 1994 Group (1994),11 specialist providers (e.g. Arts colleges) or 
no overall mission group (None). Since the 1994 group is no longer active, we reas-
signed its former member institutions (WhatUni n.d.) as “None”.
To compare Gini coefficients with other institutional metrics, we built a dataset 
that included league table information for both the Guardian and Complete Univer-
sity Guide ULTs. Since the HEPI Gini data were published in April 2018, we based 
the analysis presented below on information that was publicly available in 2018 to 
allow for meaningful comparison. We obtained whole-institution league table data 
from the Guardian University League Table 2019 (published online in May 2018) 
and the Complete University Guide 2019 (published online in April 2018).
Our dataset included HEIs for which Gini, Guardian ULT and Complete Univer-
sity Guide data were available. Institutions for which one or more indicators were 
not available were removed from the dataset. To compile the data, we used the UK 
Provider Reference Number (UKPRN) for each institution to provide a unique look-
up value for each university.12 Where datasets did not include a UKPRN (e.g. the 
Complete University Guide), we manually assigned the institutional name used in 
the league table to the relevant UKPRN. We then double-checked this for 10% of the 
institutions in the dataset and found no errors in assignment. Using these criteria, 
only one specialist college remained in the dataset (University of the Arts, London), 
so we also removed this HEI. This resulted in a final dataset of 118 institutions.
We recognise that our inclusion criteria somewhat restrict the comparability of 
our ULTs with published ULTs. However, we consider our dataset sufficiently com-
plete to provide a useful illustration of the relationship between WP and institutional 
rankings in ULTs.
Statistical analysis
We compared the individual components of both Guardian and Complete Univer-
sity Guide ULTs to assess correlations between Gini coefficients and the metrics 
included. Most metrics in the ULTs are positively scored (i.e. a higher score indi-
cates more favourable performance). However, Student:Staff ratio (SSR) is nega-
tively scored, with low SSRs indicating smaller class sizes, which are positively 
rewarded in the ULT calculation. To make the correlation direction consistent for 
improving ULT performance, we multiplied the SSR metrics within each ULT by -1.
11 The 1994 Group was another mission group representing smaller research-intensive universities. It 
dissolved in 2013 after several members left to join the Russell Group.
12 A UK Provider Reference Number is an 8-digit unique identifier allocated to an institution after suc-
cessful registration through the UKPRN portal.
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We calculated correlation coefficients and p-values from the programming lan-
guage R (R Core Team 2018) and the software RStudio (RStudio Inc. 2016), using 
the package Hmisc (Harrell 2019). To reduce the probability of false positive results 
(i.e. indicating a relationship that does not exist), p-values were Bonferroni-cor-
rected.13 To allow easy comparison between the two ULTs, which contain a differ-
ent number of metrics (as shown in Table 1), we maintained a constant significance 
level α = 0.05, and instead multiplied the p-values by the number of metrics within 
each ULT. For example, the Guardian ULT contains 9 metrics, therefore we multi-
plied p-values by a factor of 9 (adjusted p-values that exceeded the maximum of 1 
were assigned value 1).
Further, we considered the direction of correlation for all ULT metrics that 
showed a significant correlation to the Gini coefficient, and mapped this to the 
weighting each metric received within the ULT. Since a low Gini coefficient indi-
cates an institution that recruits successfully from underrepresented local areas/
postcodes, a positive correlation with the Gini coefficient indicates a negative rela-
tionship between the metric and WP. Similarly, a negative correlation with the Gini 
coefficient indicates a positive relationship between the metric and WP. This enabled 
us to determine how much of each ULT runs counter to WP agendas within the UK 
HE sector.
Results
Relationships between WP and existing ULT indicators
ULTs do not currently include any direct measure of widening participation, despite 
WP being a vital part of the UK HE landscape. However, this does not mean that 
ULTs do not indirectly reward, or punish, a WP agenda. We therefore first estab-
lished whether the metrics included in the Guardian and Complete University Guide 
league tables correlated with the diversity of the student population, as measured by 
Gini coefficients.
We found significant correlations between the Gini coefficient of an HEI and 
the institution’s performance on the majority of factors considered within both the 
Guardian and Complete University Guide ULTs (Figure 1). If ULTs do incentiv-
ise WP, we would expect a significant negative correlation between league table 
rank and Gini coefficient, since lower Gini coefficients indicate better recruitment 
from underrepresented groups. However, for the Guardian ULT, there was a sig-
nificant positive correlation between league table ranking and Gini coefficient 
(Pearson correlation coefficient 0.49, p <0.01), which means that there was a sig-
nificant negative correlation between WP and league table position (Figure 1A). 
This correlation was similar for all university mission groups (Figure  1B). The 
positive relationship between league table performance and Gini coefficient was 
13 A Bonferroni correction is a statistical method used to avoid false positive results when multiple tests 
are being run on the same dataset.
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even stronger for the Complete University Guide table (Correlation = 0.64, p 
<0.01; Figure  1C), and was true for all mission groups other than the Univer-
sity Alliance. For both league tables, there was therefore a significant trend for 
those institutions which recruited a significant proportion of their students from 
underrepresented local areas/postcodes to be placed lower down the league table 
ranking.
Having established a correlation between overall league table position and Gini 
coefficient, we then wanted to determine which of the individual league table met-
rics were correlated with Gini. Within the Guardian ULT, we found that seven of 
the nine factors considered in this league table correlated with Gini coefficient; these 
factors accounted for 85% of the weighted total score (Table 2). Of these, six (75% 
weighting) had a correlation coefficient greater than zero, indicating that increased 
ULT performance for that metric correlates with decreased diversity (an increase 
in Gini coefficient). Only one factor, National Student Survey (NSS), scored for 
Assessment and Feedback, worth 10% of the overall score, and correlated with the 
Gini coefficient in a direction that aligns WP and ULT performance.
In the Complete University Guide ULT, eight of the ten factors significantly 
correlated with Gini coefficient. These eight factors accounted for 78% of the 
Figure 1  Relationship between Gini coefficient and league table position. A+B: The Guardian ULT and 
C+D: The Complete University Guide ULT. Notes: Panels B and D present the data coded by university 
mission group. Blue numbers indicate Pearson correlation coefficients and associated p-value in italics. 
Grey shading indicates 95% confidence intervals for the linear model presented. Note that lower Gini 
coefficients indicate better recruitment from underrepresented local areas/postcodes
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total ULT score (Table  3), and all eight had a negative relationship with WP. 
There were therefore no metrics in the Complete University Guide that had a pos-
itive relationship with WP.
In both ULTs considered, the strongest correlation between Gini and ULT fac-
tors was for Entry Standards (Entry Scores). Increased Entry Score (Guardian) and 
standards (CUG) mapped closely to Gini coefficient, with those HEIs accepting stu-
dents with high tariff scores having higher Gini coefficients, and therefore lower WP 
success.
Calculation of a WP‑adjusted league table
Having established that the existing league table metrics indirectly penalise a WP 
agenda, we decided to model the effects of introducing WP as a league table met-
ric in its own right. We used the Guardian ULT as the basis for our modelling 
approach, as this league table is the most “student-facing” (i.e. addressing students’ 
needs, interests and perspectives, and reducing the dependency on research-based 
metrics). The Guardian newspaper itself also places a high value on social justice 
Table 2  Correlations between Gini coefficient and the factors making up the Guardian ULT
Notes: Bonferroni-adjusted p-values less than 0.05 show a significant correlation. Relationships with WP 
are indicated; as Gini coefficients are reverse-scored, a positive correlation between Gini coefficient and 
the league table metric indicates a negative relationship with WP.
*NSS is the National Student Survey
Guardian University League Table









NSS* – Teaching 10% 0.23 2.70
(116)
0.008 0.072 neutral










Continuation 10% 0.52 6.61
(116)
<0.001 <0.001 negative










5% 0.49 5.99 (116) <0.001 <0.001 negative
Entry Scores 15% 0.79 13.87
(116)
<0.001 <0.001 negative
Career Prospects 15% 0.53 6.66
(116)
<0.001 <0.001 negative
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within education, with regular columns and editorials highlighting the barriers to 
university access for underrepresented groups (e.g. Adams 2019; Birchall 2018; 
Edwards 2019).
To model the effect of including WP in league table calculations, we adopted a 
relatively straightforward approach based on inclusion of Gini coefficients as a WP 
metric. While we do not claim that this is the most statistically appropriate or robust 
way in which Gini could contribute to league table calculations, we present it as an 
illustrative example of the potential impact of including a WP metric. We performed 
our calculations as follows:
Step 1: Normalising the Gini coefficient to obtain a positively scoring “WP points” 
variable
Gini values are negatively scored (low Gini coefficients indicate more socially 
diverse institutions), and do not clearly relate to an observable characteristic. We 
Table 3  Correlations between Gini coefficient and the factors making up the Complete University Guide 
ULT.
Notes: Bonferroni-adjusted p-values less than 0.05 show a significant correlation. Relationships with WP 
are indicated; as Gini coefficients are reverse-scored, a positive correlation between Gini coefficient and 
the league table metric indicates a negative relationship with WP.
*NSS is the National Student Survey
Complete University Guide
















1.0 (11.1%) 0.53 6.76
(116)
<0.001 <0.001 negative










0.5 (5.6%) 0.46 5.51
(116)
<0.001 <0.001 negative
Facilities Spend 0.5 (5.6%) 0.06 0.64
(116)
0.519 1 neutral





1.0 (11.1%) 0.53 6.77
(116)
<0.001 <0.001 negative
Research Quality 1.0 (11.1%) 0.61 8.19
(115)
<0.001 <0.001 negative
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therefore did not feel that direct inclusion of Gini coefficients would be helpful to the 
compilation of a league table, since it would be difficult for prospective students to 
interpret a raw Gini coefficient. We therefore calculated “WP Points”, whereby insti-
tutions with a perfect Gini coefficient would be awarded 100 points, and the worst 
(highest) Gini coefficient in the HE sector would be awarded 0 points (Equation 1). 
As such, our method is based on the “Dividing by the largest value” approach to 
normalisation as described by Tofallis (2012).
Step 2: Recalculating the league table to incorporate WP points
We then included the WP points score in the metrics, and calculated a WP-adjusted 
Guardian score using Equation 2, where X is the weighting factor for Gini.
We set X at 0.1325, giving Gini the same weighting as Entry Scores, Career Pros-
pects, Student:Staff Ratio (SSR) and Value Added in the revised calculations. We 
then calculated league table position on the basis of the WP-adjusted Guardian 
score.14
Viewing the UK HE sector as a whole, recalculation of the league table to 
include WP meant that there was no significant correlation between the Gini 
coefficient and league table position (Figure 2C; Correlation = 0.11, p = 0.22), 
thereby removing the bias towards institutions with poor WP (compare Fig-
ures  2A and 2C). In the WP-adjusted league table, there was still a positive 
correlation between the Gini coefficient and league table position for the Rus-
sell Group, but for other institutions there was a slight negative correlation 
(Figure 2D).
The inclusion of WP as a league table metric also reduced the effect of university 
mission group on league table position (Figure 4). In the non-adjusted league table 
there was a significant impact of mission group on ULT ranking (Kruskal-Wallis H 
= 40.38, d.f. = 3, p < 0.001). In the non-adjusted league table, there were significant 
differences between the rankings of Russell Group and University Alliance members 
(Bonferroni-corrected Wilcox post-hoc test, p = 0.002), Russell Group and Million-
Plus members (p < 0.001) and between University Alliance and MillionPlus insti-
tutions (p = 0.005). In the WP-adjusted league table, there was still a significant 
difference in rankings between the different mission groups, although the effect was 
smaller (H = 5.77, d.f. = 3, p < 0.001). However, in the WP-adjusted league table 
there was no significant difference between the Russell Group and University Alli-
ance (p = 1), indicating the revised league table rewarded different mission groups 
(1)
WP Points = 100 − (100 ∗ (Institution Gini coefficient∕Highest Sector Gini coefficient))
(2)
WP − adjusted Guardian score = ((1 − X) ∗ Guardian Score) + (X ∗ Gini Normalised Score)
14 Data files and R scripts used for analysis are available at https ://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figsh are.12951 
257 and https ://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figsh are.12951 278 respectively.
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more equitably. There were still significant differences between both of these mis-
sion groups and the MillionPlus group (Russell Group p < 0.001; University Alli-
ance p < 0.001). For those interested in the outcomes of individual institutions in 
our analysis, we present annotated versions of Figures 2B+D as Figure 3.Recognis-
ing that institutional behaviours are influenced through individual positions in ULTs, 
we extended the analysis to individual HEIs. We found that including WP points 
as a metric had a direct impact on the ranking of institutions in the adjusted league 
table (Table 4).
Thirty-three institutions rose more than 10 places in the league table, and 34 fell 
more than 10 places. While our institutional inclusion criteria make rank compari-
sons between league tables somewhat imprecise, the most striking risers in the table 
were Chester (+36), and Worcester (+31), while the most significant fallers were 
Aberdeen (-44), Edinburgh (-35) and King’s College London (-35). There was no 
impact of including WP as a metric on the top 5 institutions in the table, however the 
rest of the table was reordered once WP had been incorporated (Table 5). For exam-
ple, Coventry University rose from 13th to 6th position once after inclusion of WP. 
Figure 2  Relationship between Gini coefficient and league table position for the Guardian ULT and our 
WP-adjusted Guardian ULT. 
Notes: Blue numbers indicate Pearson correlation coefficients and associated p-value in italics. Grey 
shading indicates 95% confidence intervals for the linear model presented. Note that Figure 2A+B are 
identical to Figure  1A+B, but are presented again here for ease of comparison with the WP-adjusted 
league table. Note that lower Gini coefficients indicate better recruitment from underrepresented local 
areas/postcodes
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Five institutions (University College London, Exeter, London School of Economics, 
Nottingham and Bristol) dropped out of the top 20, and were replaced by organisa-
tions with more favourable WP values (Lincoln, Derby, Liverpool Hope, Surrey and 
Portsmouth).
Figure 3  Annotated versions of Figures 2B and 2D to indicate the relative positions of individual institu-
tions. 
Notes: A is based on the published Guardian ULT 2019 and B is based on our WP-adjusted league table 
when correlated with Gini coefficient. Note that lower Gini coefficients indicate better recruitment from 
underrepresented local areas/postcodes
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Figure 4  Impact of a WP-adjusted league table on the Ranking of each UK University Mission Group 
Notes: A: The ranks of mission groups in the existing Guardian ULT, and B: ranks of mission groups in 
our WP-adjusted league table. RG = Russell Group, UA = University Alliance, M+ = MillionPlus. Bars 
indicate inter-quartile range, central thick line indicates the median, lines the range and points indicate 
outliers. Results of Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc Wilcoxon tests are indicated with asterisks; NS = not 
significant, ** indicates p < 0.01, *** indicates p < 0.001, **** indicates p < 0.0001
Table 4  Biggest risers and fallers in a WP-adjusted league table
Notes: Institutions presented are those which changed position by 20 places or more after inclusion of 
WP points as a metric
Risers Fallers










Chester +36 58 Aberdeen −44 95
Worcester +31 60 Edinburgh −35 63
Hull +28 78 King’s College London −35 93
Cardiff Metropolitan +27 72 Strathclyde −33 86
Sheffield Hallam +26 44 Heriot-Watt −28 94
Manchester Metropolitan +25 48 Robert Gordon −28 106
Salford +24 64 SOAS University of London −27 85
Northumbria +23 25 Oxford Brookes −25 66
Edge Hill +23 32 Staffordshire −24 68
De Montfort +22 49 Bristol −23 43
Liverpool John Moores +21 28 Glasgow −23 47
Anglia Ruskin +21 82 Queen’s, Belfast −21 73
Central Lancashire +20 56 Abertay −21 89
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Discussion
A strong negative relationship between most league table metrics and WP
Our analysis indicates that a significant proportion of the existing UK league table 
metrics are positively correlated with Gini coefficients, meaning that these metrics 
have a negative relationship with WP. We found a significant correlation between 
improved ULT performance and decreased diversity in their student body for 75% 
of the weighted total of the Guardian ULT, and for 78% of the weighted Complete 
University Guide ULT. The strongest correlation in both ULTs turned out to be 
between entry tariffs and Gini coefficient. Students from relatively disadvantaged 
backgrounds have been shown to perform equally strongly as more advantaged peers 
when admitted with lower entry tariffs (Hoare and Johnston 2011; Mountford-Zim-
dars et al. 2015). At the same time, admitting these students negatively impacts a 
Table 5  Impact of including WP on league table position for the top 20 institutions
Source: (left-hand column): Guardian ULT 2019, published online in May 2018
Notes: Institutions in bold italics either exit (left-hand column) or enter (right-hand column) the top 20 
when adjusted for WP. Capitalised institutions rose or fell 5 or more places
Guardian ULT 2019 WP-adjusted League Table
Institution Change Institution WP adj. Rank Rank Change
Cambridge 1 Cambridge 1 1 0
Oxford 2 Oxford 2 2 0
St Andrews 3 St Andrews 3 3 0
Loughborough 4 Loughborough 4 4 0
Durham 5 Durgham 5 5 0
Bath 6 COVENTRY 6 13 + 7
Imperial College 
London
7 Lancaster 7 9 + 2
Warwick 8 Bath 8 6 − 2
Lancaster 9 NOTTINGHAM TRENT 9 16 + 7
Leeds 10 LINCOLN 10 22 + 12
University College 
London
11 Imperial College London 11 7 − 4
York 12 Warwick 12 8 − 4
Coventry 13 DERBY 13 29 + 16
Exeter 14 East Anglia (UEA) 14 18 + 4
London School of 
Economics
15 LEEDS 15 10 − 5
Nottingham Trent 16 York 16 12 − 4
Nottingham 17 LIVERPOOL HOPE 17 33 + 16
East Anglia (UEA) 18 Surrey 18 21 + 3
Birmingham 19 PORTSMOUTH 19 25 + 6
Bristol 20 Birmingham 20 19 − 1
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HEI’s ULT performance. This indicates a clear contradiction in that laudable efforts 
of “good” HEIs seeking to improve both WP and ULT performance by opening up 
to disadvantaged-yet-talented students actually seem to decrease ULT performance.
A negative correlation between WP and the Value‑Added metric in the Guardian 
ULT
The most unexpected relationship we found in our analysis was the negative rela-
tionship between WP and the Value-Added metric in the Guardian ULT (correlation 
with Gini = 0.37, p < 0.001). Given that Value Added is defined in terms of students 
with lower entry grades attaining a first or upper second-class honours degree (see 
footnote 9), it might be expected that this indicator would reward universities with 
more diverse student cohorts. However, our analysis indicates that Value Added is 
not a sufficiently good metric to directly reward institutions with a commitment to 
WP. The reasons for the negative relationship revealed in our analysis are unclear. 
For HEIs admitting lower-tariff students, high “value added” may mean the differ-
ence between a student failing or graduating with a 2.2 (a lower second-class hon-
ours degree). However, this would not be recognised in the Value-Added measure 
in the league table. Given the close correlation between entry tariffs and Gini coef-
ficients, diverse HEIs giving lower tariff students a chance may be punished by this 
measure if they “only” improve disadvantaged students to a 2.2 level, compared to 
a higher-tariff, less diverse HEI taking potential 2.2 students and adding the small 
amount of value required for these students to reach a 2.1 grade. While Value Added 
is a useful metric, our analysis indicates it is still negatively related to WP, so does 
not provide a mechanism for institutions with diverse student cohorts to be recog-
nised in the league tables.
A further result of interest is that one ULT metric, namely NSS scores for Assess-
ment and Feedback, does correlate positively with more diverse student intake. 
Again, the reasons for this are unclear, and understanding how student expecta-
tions and differing pedagogies between different HEIs interact to produce this result 
would require further exploration beyond the quantitative data approach we have 
taken here.
Possible explanations for the relationships observed
Although we have determined the generally negative relationships between the 
various league table metrics and WP, the data presented do not explain why such 
correlations exist. We anticipate the reasons for the relationships between WP 
and the individual league table metrics likely to be complex and different for the 
various metrics. For example, degree completion may be driven less by the HEI 
and more by the students’ support network, such as friends, family and their fel-
low students (Wilcox et al. 2005). It may be that most students enrolled in univer-
sities that recruit from high participation areas expect to graduate, resulting in an 
environment where non-completion is seen as unusual. Another factor is that stu-
dents from lower participation backgrounds are more likely to combine studying 
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with paid employment or family care responsibilities; this may impact continua-
tion and completion (Leese 2010; Reay et  al. 2010). Students from underrepre-
sented backgrounds are also more likely to fall victim to the “hidden curriculum” 
of HE, i.e. the norms, expectations and language of university study they are less 
familiar with than students from privileged backgrounds (Margolis 2002), which 
may underpin some of the relationships observed.
However, it is less easy to see a direct causal relationship between the diversity 
of the student body and indicators such as Research Quality or Facilities Spend. 
Here there may be a more complex set of causalities; institutions that prioritise 
these activities are rewarded in the league tables, therefore gain prestige, become 
more attractive to applicants, therefore can set higher entry grades, and thus are 
less likely to be attended by those from disadvantaged backgrounds.
Levelling the playing field
We have demonstrated that WP can be incorporated into ULT calculations rela-
tively simply using readily available data, and that this can reward institutions 
with a diverse student intake through improved rankings. Inclusion of a calibrated 
WP metric mitigates the bias against WP in the current league table calculations 
we identified. Inclusion of a WP metric also has the effect of reducing some of 
the differences between university mission groups (particularly between the Rus-
sell Group and the University Alliance), somewhat levelling the playing field 
between universities with different institutional priorities.
In our context, the Russell Group does not place an emphasis on WP in their 
mission statement, whereas the MillionPlus and University Alliance groups both 
actively emphasise a WP component. In our revised league table, there is a posi-
tive relationship between WP and ULT performance (negative correlation with 
Gini coefficient) for all mission groups except the Russell Group, mirroring 
the emphasis on WP in the mission statements of the other groups. Our league 
table therefore allows universities to be recognised for their WP activity, with 
the league table better reflecting the extent to which institutions are successful in 
their specified WP mission. We believe this is a fairer way for institutions to be 
ranked, which allows a wider variety of types of “excellence” to be reflected in 
institutional prestige.
The stated aim of ULTs is to inform the choice of university applicants. Applicant 
characteristics have changed over time, and it is clear that Generation Z15 is much 
more involved with the social justice agenda than generations born in the late 20th 
century (Mohr and Mohr 2017). A recent report indicates that 72% of UK students 
think that universities should take educational background into consideration when 
making admissions decisions, and half think that those from deprived areas should 
be allowed in with lower grades than their more advantaged peers (Dale-Harris 
15 The term Generation Z, which emerged in the 1990s, refers to people born in the early 21st century 
who grew up with the Internet.
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2019). There is therefore a desire for “fairness” amongst current university appli-
cants, and direct inclusion of WP in a transparent way through ULTs may influence 
student decision-making. The same marketisation forces that have driven the adop-
tion of the NSS as a metric have also encouraged research into the Student Expe-
rience which suggests that today’s students are seeking different things from their 
time in HE (Seemiller and Grace 2017). Inclusion of WP in league tables would 
turn an institution’s often hidden WP efforts into a more transparent metric when it 
comes to student choice.
Existing academic literature is very clear that, within the specific context of HE in 
the UK, ULTs influence institutional decision-making through the mechanism of key 
performance indicators (KPIs)16 (Hazelkorn 2007; Hosier and Hoolash 2019; Locke 
et  al. 2008; Lynch 2015). We have demonstrated that universities fulfilling their 
legal and societal duty to widen participation are actively penalised by existing ULT 
indicators. For example, increasing entry requirements would increase ULT standing 
in both the Guardian and Complete University Guide ULTs, while at the same time 
excluding the kind of students from low participation areas who currently excel after 
being enabled to enrol by reduced-tariff offers (Hoare and Johnston 2011). This has 
serious market consequences, which in turn exert incentives to diminish WP efforts. 
We anticipate that including a WP metric in ULTs would alter institutional decision-
making; once WP is included in the league tables it may be more likely to be incor-
porated into institutional KPIs and result in more meaningful WP activity. Pursuit of 
such a metric would then be rewarded by reputational prestige.
Limitations
It should be noted that our modelling approach is based on using the POLAR- 
based Gini coefficient as a measure of WP. As mentioned earlier, we selected this 
measure because Gini coefficients can be generated from publicly available data 
for the majority of UK universities, and use an established robust methodology 
(Gini 1955 [1912]; Martin 2018). However, Gini coefficients may not be the most 
appropriate WP measure to be included in a WP-adjusted league table. POLAR has 
been criticised as a methodology because it is postcode-based, which makes it likely 
to underestimate the heterogeneity of HE participation within a geographical area, 
particularly in rural parts of the UK (HEFCE 2014).
Assessing WP on the basis of geography also obscures the impact of other fac-
tors influencing HE participation, such as ethnicity or socio-economic status. The 
Scottish government uses an alternative measure within Scotland’s HE sector, com-
paring areas across 7 different domains of deprivation, including education, health 
and income, to produce the Scottish Index of Multiple Deprivation (Scottish Govern-
ment 2020). This and similar metrics can allow a more detailed breakdown of how 
16 A key performance indicator is a measurable target that is used to drive management decision-mak-
ing. In HE, this might be the number of students admitted, or the proportion of students who gain a 
“higher” class degree (a first or a 2:1 in the UK).
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specific deprivations affect HE intake, but still miss factors that affect individuals 
rather than geographic areas, such as ethnicity.
UCAS has developed the Multiple Equality Measure (MEM; see footnote 10) 
as a more sophisticated predictor of higher education participation, which includes 
ethnicity, school type and whether students receive free school meals (a marker of 
low socio-economic status), the geographic information provided by POLAR and 
a number of other predictors (UCAS 2018b). Since this intersectional measure of 
HE participation is calculated at the level of the individual rather than considering 
postcode, it allows for a more nuanced assessment of WP. However, these data are 
not currently publicly available by institution, hence our reliance on the POLAR-
based Gini coefficients for our modelling approach. We would encourage league 
table providers to work with UCAS to incorporate MEM as a league table metric if 
possible. It should also be noted that for the sake of simplicity, our modelling adopts 
a “Divide by the largest value” approach to normalisation (Tofallis 2012), which 
 contrasts with the S-score methodology17 used for other metrics in the  Guardian 
ULT (Hiely-Rayner 2019). There are a variety of methods used to normalise league 
table metrics. Tofallis (2012) highlights four different methodologies used, and 
notes that the normalisation method chosen can have significant impacts on the 
 subsequent ranking of institutions. We do not advocate our modelling approach as 
the most statistically robust method of league table calculation, but present it as a 
proof of concept that WP can and should be included in ULTs.
Conclusions and recommendations
The compilation of university league tables is an inherently political act, with the 
choice and weighting of metrics resulting in particular characteristics of individual 
institutions being rewarded or penalised. One aspect of contemporary universities 
that is currently not considered by league tables is the diversity of the student intake, 
and the extent to which an institution has been successful in widening participation 
in HE. Taking the UK as a case study for ULT compilation, our analysis demon-
strates the following:
(1) The existing ULT methodologies penalise institutions that successfully widen 
access to HE. We found 75% of the Guardian and 78% of the Complete Univer-
sity Guide metrics to have a negative relationship with WP, which includes the 
Guardian’s “Value Added” metric which might be expected to reward institu-
tions with a more diverse student body.
(2) It is possible to include WP as a league table indicator in its own right. We have 
demonstrated this through the use of Gini coefficients based on publicly avail-
able POLAR data, but other as-yet unpublished indicators of WP may be more 
powerful tools.
17 The S-score methodology is a normalisation approach which allows standardisation of metrics 
between institutions. The approach is based on using standard deviation to obtain a normal distribution; 
for further details see Hiely-Rayner (2019).
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(3) Including WP as a league table metric removes the negative sector-level relation-
ship between WP and league table position. This also reduces the difference in 
ranking between institutions of different stated mission groups, and therefore 
levels the playing field between diverse institutions.
We find that, overwhelmingly, current ULT performance correlates negatively 
with a WP agenda. There is therefore little incentive for institutions to priori-
tise WP when it comes to league table performance. If anything, we find that a 
commitment to WP damages league table position, resulting in a direct conflict 
between increasing student diversity and institutional prestige (Shaw 2009).
However, we also demonstrate that it is possible to adjust league table 
methodologies to include WP, and therefore reward institutions which actively 
recruit from a diverse student population. We therefore call upon league table 
compilers to revisit their conception of a “good university”, that fully reflects 
the diversity of institution types and intended missions. The fact that two of the 
three league tables are compiled by newspapers has implications for bias in ULT 
 compilation; journalists in the UK are highly likely to have attended an elite 
 university and been educated at a private school (Sutton Trust 2019), so may have 
a narrower conception of a “good” university than the HE sector as a whole. In 
the UK, given the legal requirements for universities to widen access to HE, we 
believe it is appropriate and fair for WP to be included in league table metrics. In 
this study, using publicly available data and existing robust methodologies, we 
demonstrate that inclusion of WP is not only possible but also effective in terms 
of a fairer reflection in ULTs of HEIs’ efforts in widening participation.
Rewarding universities’ social justice activities through improved league 
table positioning requires ULT compilers to make an active choice to do so. This 
necessitates reconsidering existing metrics for potential bias, and considering 
the adoption of new metrics to capture diversity and participation. While the UK 
has a clear statutory obligation to pursue WP as a policy objective in HE, we 
recognise that the legal situation in other nations may not stipulate this objective. 
It might therefore be technically challenging or less appropriate to incorporate 
WP-based metrics into other national or international league tables. Neverthe-
less, there are two very important technical lessons which international readers 
might draw from our analysis. First, that intuitively appealing data (in our case, 
the “Value Added” score) might not actually reward the behaviours intended (WP 
rates). Second, that university rankings, both in the activities they measure and 
reward, and their methodologies, can be challenged rigorously if academics are 
prepared to “get their hands dirty” and propose something better.
We call upon the academic community to actively lobby for changes to ULT 
compilation, rather than passively accepting a set of metrics that do not adequately 
value the diversity of the sector. However flawed they are, league tables and rank-
ings currently drive institutional behaviours and student choice. There is a collective 
responsibility to ensure that the indicators in ULTs at least attempt to describe all 
the diverse characteristics of a quality university, which we believe in the UK con-
text should include widening participation.
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